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Abstract 
Empirical tests of purchasing power parity (PPP) are implicitly based on the 
conditions of symmetry and proportionality of the price coefficients. We investigate a 
separate condition, which we term homogeneity. Specifically, while there may be 
factors that drive a wedge between prices and exchange rates, when these factors are 
held constant we would expect a change in exchange rates to be associated with a 
proportional, or homogeneous, change in prices. To test for the existence of 
homogeneity in prices, we conduct two experiments. First, we apply a time-varying-
coefficient procedure to nine euro-area countries as well as the euro area as a whole 
during the (monthly) sample period, 1999: M1 to 2011:M3. Second we apply the 
same procedure to the same group of countries, plus Canada, Japan and Mexico, over 
the longer period, 1957:M4 to 2011:M3. We find that averages of the price 
coefficients, corrected for specification biases, are uniformly homogeneous in the 
long run, providing strong support for PPP. 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical tests of purchasing power parity (PPP) are implicitly based on the 
conditions of symmetry and proportionality of the coefficients of the exchange rate-
price relationship: symmetry is said to apply if the coefficients on the domestic and 
foreign price levels are identical (in absolute value); proportionality applies if the 
coefficients on both price levels are equal to unity (in absolute value). Most empirical 
studies, however, do not directly test for the existence of these two conditions; those 
that do carry out such tests typically fail to find evidence in support of the conditions, 
although, typically, symmetry is more easily accepted than proportionality (e.g., 
Cheung and Lai (1993), Moosa (1994), Edison, Gagnon and Melick (1997), Li (1999), 
Moon and Perron (2004), Cerrato and Serantis, (2008)). Yet, as pointed out by Li 
(1999, p. 410, original italics), “their validity is a maintained hypothesis in unit root 
tests for the long-run PPP using real exchange rates”.1 In this connection, unit root -- 
as well as co-integration -- tests have often generated results supportive of long run 
PPP, although the results are subject to considerable uncertainty, reflecting structural 
changes, varying degrees of volatility related to different exchange-rate regimes, and 
other possible misspecifications that may arise using long sample periods. At the same 
time, as pointed out by Taylor and Taylor (2004) in their survey of the PPP literature, 
most empirical studies tend to reject short run PPP.2 
PPP, however, is a fundamental building block of international economics and 
finance theory; it is, therefore, surprising that the support for this basic concept is so 
weak. In this paper we investigate the possibility that, while the basic PPP relationship 
does hold, attempts to estimate that relationship have typically been based on an 
overly-restrictive specification that tends to yield biased estimates. Specifically, we 
argue that factors other than prices that affect the exchange rate need to be taken into 
account. These factors could include short run volatility effects, as in Dornbusch 
overshooting, and medium term structural effects, such as divergences in wage costs 
or productivity levels. We show that omitting such effects would lead to biased 
coefficient estimates and, under certain circumstances, these omitted variables would 
                                                 
1 Examples of such unit root tests on PPP include Lothian and Taylor (1996, 2000) and Enders (2009, 
pp. 382-84) 
2 By short run PPP we mean that a change in prices is rapidly reflected in nominal exchange rates with 
little or no process of adjustment. Long run PPP is defined as a situation where a change in prices is 
eventually fully reflected in exchange rates but only after a period of adjustment. 
 2 
also be expected to generate symmetric, but not proportional, results. A key issue 
from the point of view of the theory of PPP is the following: Are the coefficients of 
prices and exchange rates in an exchange rate-price relationship homogeneous of 
degree one (henceforth, homogeneous)? If the answer is yes, then changes in the 
exchange rate result in proportionate changes in prices. There may be other factors 
affecting PPP that are important in the data, but are not important for the comparative-
static analysis of PPP. If this is the case, then the standard textbook cases obtain. 
However, if the price effects themselves are non-homogenous, then standard models 
are simply built on a false premise. 
In what follows, we conduct two experiments. First, we investigate the 
homogeneity condition for nine euro-area countries as well as for the euro area as a 
whole. We use monthly data over the sample period 1999:M1 to 2011:M3, a period 
corresponding to euro-area membership of the nine countries considered. Second, we 
extend the experiment to include three additional countries -- Canada, Japan, and 
Mexico -- over a longer sample period, 1957:M1 to 2011:M3. Our reference currency 
in both experiments is the U.S. dollar. We apply a generalized cointegration technique 
(Hall, Swamy and Tavlas (2012), Hall, Kenjegaliev, Swamy and Tavlas (2013a)) 
based on a time-varying-coefficient regression.  The underlying idea of this approach 
is that the coefficients in a PPP relationship are homogeneous if their bias-free 
components take unit values even if this relationship may involve omitted and/or 
variables subject to measurement errors.3 Therefore, if we find that the bias-free 
components of the coefficients -- we explain below what we mean by bias-free 
components -- of a PPP relationship are homogeneous, then the prices and the 
exchange rate are cointegrated. Moreover, an appealing feature of this technique is 
that it is possible to obtain estimates of the time-varying coefficients and to reproduce 
them in visual form to assess the proportionality and symmetry conditions. There is, 
of course, a “little pinch” of uncertainty in accurate estimation of bias-free 
components.  This could potentially distort the results of the time-varying coefficients 
and give misleading deductions. We address this issue in this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the time-
varying PPP relationship and the time-varying-coefficients’ methodology used to 
estimate that relationship. Section 3 discusses the concept of generalized cointegration 
                                                 
3 Here bias-free components are those that are free of incorrect-functional form, omitted-variable and 
measurement-error biases (see the Appendix below).  
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and its relationship to time-varying-coefficient estimation. Section 4 presents the data 
and estimation results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Time-varying purchasing power parity 
The law of one price states that the prices of identical goods in two countries 
converted into equivalent currency units will be the same to preclude arbitrage 
opportunities in both economies. Formally, the standard representation of the law of 
one price is 
 , 1,...,i iP S FP i N= × =
 
(1) 
where S  is the nominal exchange rate (defined as the domestic price of one unit of 
foreign currency), iP  is a domestic price of good i and iFP  is a foreign price of that 
good. The main assumptions here are that the good is tradable and that the market is 
frictionless.  
The general price level in the home economy at time t can be computed by 
taking a weighted average of all the individual prices (Chen and Engel (2005), Sarno 
and Taylor (2002)), 
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(2) 
The general price level in the foreign economy is 
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(3) 
where
1
1N ii Fθ= =∑ , and it is assumed that for i = 1, ...,N, i iFθ θ=  in both economies 
and correspond to the weights of the good i in the consumption bundle. 
Moreover, tP and tFP  in Eqs. (2) and (3) are usually index numbers representing the 
price level in the economy. Using Eqs. (2) and (3) the absolute version of PPP is 
expressed as 
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or, alternatively,  
 1,...,t t tP S FP t k= × =
 
(5) 
Eq. (5) is an approximation to PPP. Empirical studies have typically found that in its 
strict form Eq. (5) does not hold.  
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Due to the violation of the law of one price, domestic and foreign prices may 
have different impacts on the formation of the exchange rate (MacDonald (1993)) so 
that their shares can potentially change in each period. In addition, it is possible that 
other effects may distort the PPP relationship in the short or medium term. There are 
almost certainly short run volatility effects on the exchange rate since, typically, the 
volatility of the logged exchange rate in the short run is much larger than the volatility 
of prices. It is also possible that medium-term effects, such as a Balassa-Samuelson 
effect, might affect the price measures. In this circumstance, Eq. (5) can be specified 
as 
 1 2t tt t t t
b bS A P FP−= × ×
 
(6a) 
where tS  is the nominal exchange rate (domestic price of a foreign currency unit) at 
time t, tA  is a term that captures effects not correlated with prices (such as, for 
example,  speculative activity in the exchange market), and tP  and tFP  are (again) 
domestic and foreign prices, respectively. The time-dependent coefficients  of prices 
( 1tb  and 2tb ) will reflect a range of omitted factors, such as the effects of 
transportation costs, tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and, possibly, other 
misspecifications that may well vary over time  (see Swamy, Tavlas, Hall, and 
Hondroyiannis (2010)).  
 Eq. (6a) is one possible view of the world suggesting that the basic 
relationship between prices and exchange rates is non-homogeneous. However a 
different view of the world would be one in which homogeneity is maintained, but 
other factors enter the exchange rate-price relationship. Thus, let us assume that there 
are factors, such as labor productivity, that enter the PPP relationship. Then, the 
following relationship may hold: 
 1 bt t t t tS A P FP Z
−= × × ×
 
(6b) 
where the variable Z may create a wedge between the exchange-rate-price relationship 
over time, but the exchange-rate-price part of relationship (6b) is nevertheless 
homogeneous. Consequently, Eq. (6b) would be consistent with the comparative static 
properties of a standard international macro model. Note that Eq. (6b) implies that, in 
the presence of such factors as differences in productivity levels, the coefficients on 
the two price variables in (6a) would not be expected to be unity; effectively, such 
factors act as omitted variables, impacting on the coefficients of the price variables in 
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(6a). Eq. (6b), in contrast, implies that explicitly taking these factors into account 
yields homogeneity of prices.   
Either of these two possibilities can be nested within a version of Eq. (6a) with 
time-varying coefficients. In logarithmic terms, the two possibilities can both be 
written as   
 0 1 2t t t t t ts b b p b fp= + −
 
(7) 
where lower case letters represent logs of the respective variables of Eq. (6a). Relative 
PPP implies that there is a proportionate effect on the exchange rate from the two 
prices.  
Eq. (7) can be used to demonstrate the bias that occurs in a standard OLS 
regression with fixed coefficients. If we take Eq. (7) and rewrite it in the following 
way 
    ))()(( 221100210 tttttttt fpbbpbbbbfpbpbbs −−−+−+−+= , 
it is clear that in this regression the error term is the entire last term in parenthesis. For 
OLS to provide consistent parameter estimates, we would require that the two prices 
be uncorrelated with the error term, and this is almost surely not the case as prices 
also comprise part of the error term. So, if there are any omitted variables, or if the 
weights of the two prices vary for any reason, standard techniques are not appropriate 
for investigating PPP. 
The standard definition of PPP implies that Eq. (7) will have equal coefficients 
for all t. Homogeneity will be obtained when 1 2 1t tb b= =  for all t, either on average in 
the long run or at every point in time. However, if the coefficients do not satisfy these 
homogeneity conditions and are not constant, then relative PPP no longer holds, at 
least in its conventionally accepted form. To show this consider the following 
 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t t ts s b b b p b p b fp b fp− − − − − −− = − + − − −
 
(8) 
In Eq. (8) the exchange rate at time t-1 is simply subtracted from the current rate at 
time t. This can be rewritten in more compact way as 
 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t ts b b b p b p b fp b fp− − −∆ = − + ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆
 
(9) 
Rearranging, Eq. (9) we get 
 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 1( )t t t t t t t t t t ts b b p b fp b b p b fp− − −∆ = + ∆ − ∆ − −∆ + ∆
 
(10) 
Typically, only the first three terms on the right hand side of Eq. (10) are used to 
represent relative PPP. However, from Eq. (10) it is clear that, if the coefficients of 
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prices are time-varying, then not only current price changes impact ts∆ ,but also the 
previous period’s prices. Moreover, the coefficients on past prices and current 
changes in prices are inversely related if 0 1,2jtb j∆ < = ; only if 0 1,2jtb j∆ > =  
will the direction of the impact be the same as the direction of the current changes in 
prices. The effect of past prices diminishes if 1 1 1,2jtb j− < ∆ < = . It should be noted 
that 1tb∆  and 2tb∆ depend on the changes in all relevant variables on which 1tb  and 
2tb  depend. The lower the absolute change in prices compared to the change in the 
exchange rate, the higher the values of coefficient difference, and, therefore, past 
prices dominate in the exchange rate change. 
As mentioned, our aim is to test for the existence of homogeneity in Eq. (7); 
homogeneity requires both coefficients to be equal to unity (although with opposite 
signs).  An attractive element of the time-varying-coefficient regression is that it 
allows us to display the dynamic evolution of the individual coefficients, which can 
be analytically evaluated against the null hypotheses without the need of sophisticated 
statistical tests. As a result, it is convenient to present and examine the evolution of 
the coefficients in visual form.  
 
3. Generalized cointegration  
The econometric approach we use is provided in detail in (Hall, Swamy and 
Tavlas (2012, 2014), Hall, Kenjegaliev, Swamy and Tavlas (2013a)); however, as it is 
a relatively novel approach, we will provide an intuitive account of the ideas used; we 
also provide references to a formal exposition of the TVC approach used in Appendix 
A. The approach uses the concepts of generalized cointegration (Hall, Swamy and 
Tavlas (2012)), and time-varying-coefficient (TVC) estimation (Swamy, Tavlas, Hall 
and Hondroyiannis (2010)); this approach allows for the consistent estimation of 
models in the presence of an unknown true functional form, omitted variables, and 
measurement errors.  
Both generalised cointegration and TVC estimation proceed from an important 
theorem first established by Swamy and Mehta (1975), which was subsequently 
confirmed by Granger (2008). This theorem states that any nonlinear function can be 
exactly represented by a model that is linear in variables but which has time-varying 
 7 
coefficients. The implication of this result is that, even if we do not know the correct 
functional form of a relationship, we can still represent this relationship as a time-
varying-coefficient relationship and, hence, estimate it. 
This theorem underlies the idea of the concept called generalised cointegration 
(Hall, Swamy and Tavlas (2012)), which relaxes some of the stringent assumptions of 
standard cointegration analysis. The particular version of generalized cointegration 
implemented here does two things. First, it allows for the possibility that we may have 
important omitted variables. Second, it solves the unknown functional-form problem.  
That is, under generalized cointegration we are able to estimate bias-free relationships 
among a set of variables even (i) if we do not know the true, underlying functional 
form and (ii) even if there are missing variables. Specifically, generalized 
cointegration works by correcting a relationship for specification errors (such as 
omitted-variable biases).  
Underlying generalized cointegration is a new way of thinking about, and testing 
for, cointegration that emphasises the properties of the real world rather than a 
particular model. If, in the real world, a causal cointegrating vector exists which 
determines a variable, say, the real exchange rate, then, obviously, if one of the 
explanatory variables (say X) in that relationship changes, the real exchange rate will 
also change. This circumstance implies that the partial derivative of the real exchange 
rate with respect to X is non-zero. Thus, if we had a way of obtaining consistent 
estimate of this partial derivative and testing to see if it is significantly different from 
zero, this would give us a way of testing for the presence of cointegration in the real 
world (rather than just among an arbitrary set of variables). So, we might be able to 
assert that there is a stable relationship between, say, two variables in the real world, 
even though we do not know its exact functional form and/or all the variables that 
comprise that relationship. This would still be a very useful statement to make from a 
policy perspective, although, obviously, not as useful as knowing the complete form 
of that relationship. 
Of course, this may appear as asking a great deal of an estimation technique. 
However, that is precisely what TVC estimation aims to provide (Swamy, Tavlas, 
Hall and Hondroyiannis (2010)). This technique builds from the Swamy and Mehta 
theorem, mentioned above, where it turns out that the time-varying coefficients in a 
model without omitted variables or measurement error are the partial derivatives of 
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the unknown non-linear functional form. So, in the absence of other misspecification, 
testing the significance of the time-varying coefficients would be equivalent to testing 
for generalised cointegration.4 
Swamy, Tavlas, Hall and Hondroyiannis (2010) show exactly what happens to 
the TVCs as other forms of misspecification are added to the model. If we allow for 
the presence of some omitted variables from the model, then each of the true time-
varying coefficients gets contaminated by a term that involves the relationship 
between the omitted and included regressors. Also, if we allow for measurement error, 
then each of the TVCs is further contaminated by a term that involves measurement 
errors. . Thus, as one might expect, the estimated TVC is no longer a consistent 
estimate of the true partial derivatives of the non-linear function, but is instead biased 
due to the effects of omitted variables and measurement errors. In what follows, we 
call these biased coefficients the “total effect” coefficients. There are exact 
mathematical proofs provided for our statements up to this point. 
Some parametric assumptions are needed to make TVC estimation fully 
operational.5 We make two key assumptions. First, we assume that the time-varying 
coefficients themselves are determined by a set of stochastic linear equations which 
make them a function of a set of variables that we call driver (or coefficient-driver) 
variables (In what follows, we call these coefficients the “total effects” coefficients). 
This is a relatively uncontroversial assumption. Second, we assume that some of these 
drivers are correlated with the misspecification in the model and some of them are 
correlated with the time-variation coming from the non-linear (true) functional form. 
With this assumption, we can then simply remove the biases from the TVCs by 
removing the effect of the set of coefficient drivers which are correlated with the 
misspecification. Effectively, the coefficient drivers absorb omitted-variable and 
measurement-error biases. This procedure, then, yields a consistent set of estimates of 
-- what we call “bias-free” coefficients -- the true partial derivatives of the unknown 
nonlinear function, which may then be tested by constructing t-tests in the usual way. 
An important difference between coefficient drivers and instrumental variables is that 
a valid instrument requires a relevant variable which is uncorrelated with the 
                                                 
4 For recent applications of our technique, see Hall, Kenjegaliev, Swamy and Tavlas (2013a, 2013b). 
5 Formal derivations of the ideas discussed in this paper are provided in Swamy and Tavlas (2005, 
2007). These derivations are discussed in the Appendix. 
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misspecification (disturbance), which often proves hard to find. Additionally, such an 
instrument is also required to be correlated with the relevant independent variable. For 
a valid driver we need variables that are correlated with the misspecification and we 
would expect that this is much easier to achieve. 
Swamy, Tavlas, Hall and Hondroyiannis (2010) provide the distribution theory 
for conducting statistical inference and constructing confidence intervals for the TVC 
estimation technique; those authors assumed that the coefficients have normal 
distributions.6 This proof extends to the case of generalised cointegration even when 
we are testing under the null of no cointegration. This at first appears surprising and 
so it is worth explaining why this happens. In the standard OLS testing framework 
such as the Dickey-Fuller test, the non-standard distribution comes from the fact that 
under the null of nonstationarity, the error term in the regressions may be non-
stationary while under the alternative, it is stationary. This does not occur with TVC 
estimation. The basic TVC model, such as Eq. (7) contains a unique error term in the 
form of a term of the intercept.  In addition, the errors appear in the state equations 
(A4 in the appendix). The key assumption to deriving normal inference is that these 
errors are stationary. However, this is easy to achieve as the coefficient drivers may 
contain lags of all the variables in the model and hence can always achieve a 
stationary error process by a sufficiently large number of lags that explain most of the 
variation in the coefficients.  
These consistent (or bias-free) estimates may then be used to test for generalised 
cointegration, even in the presence of omitted variables. It is important to stress what 
is being claimed here -- as well as what is not being claimed. This test aims to tell us 
whether or not there is cointegration in the real world, that is, whether there actually 
exists a stable function determining the dependent variable of interest. It does not, 
however, tell us the complete form of that relationship or what the missing variables 
might be. 
 
4. Data and results 
                                                 
6 The nonnormal distributions of these coefficients substantially complicate these inference procedures 
(Swamy et al. (2010, pp. 16-20)). 
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We provide estimates of the price-exchange rate relationship (Eq. (7)) under two 
experiments, using monthly data.7 First, we use as our data sample a group of euro-
zone countries that shared the same currency over the estimation period, 1999:M1 to 
2011:M3. For this experiment, the nine euro-area countries are Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Additionally, we 
examine the relationship for the overall euro area. For our second experiment, we 
extend the group of countries to also include Canada, Japan and Mexico and the 
sample period to 1957:M4 to 2011:M3. Under both experiments, the United States is 
assumed to be the foreign country; the bilateral nominal exchange rate is defined as 
the number of domestic currency units per U.S. dollar (IFS series, ... AG.ZF). All data 
are from IMF International Financial Statistics (ESDS database). Prices in each 
country are represented by consumer price indices (CPI) (IFS series, 64…ZF; for EU 
64H…ZF). Within the first exercise, with the exception of Greece, the data consist of 
monthly observations starting from the introduction of euro in 1999:M1 through 
2011:M3; for Greece, the data start from 2001:M1, the year (and month) in which that 
country joined the euro zone. All variables are specified in logs. The coefficient 
drivers used are given in Section 4.2. 
It is worth emphasizing that the estimation period for our first experiment is 
such that the countries considered were all in the euro area, and, therefore, had their 
relative nominal exchange rates locked together.  Therefore, one might have expected 
that all these countries would have the same domestic price level, as this is the 
implication of the strongest form of PPP.  Such an expectation, of course, did not turn 
out to be true.  For example over the period of Greek membership the Greek price 
level grew by 20 per cent more than the German price level. Hence, PPP could not 
have held for those two countries. This implies that either we abandon the idea of 
testing for PPP altogether, or we think of PPP as holding in such a way that allows for 
other things to be going on at the same time. For example, there may be other 
variables in the PPP relationship, the exclusion of which would bias the coefficients 
on the price variables. Thus, while it may be true that in an experiment with  changes 
in the price level,  there is a proportionate change in the exchange rate, it may also be 
true that changing productivity levels and labor market (and other) conditions might 
                                                 
7 In conventional estimation, it is often better to use low-frequency data in estimation because OLS 
tends to be biased as a result of the missing dynamics. TVC estimation is not subject to this bias. 
Therefore, in TVC estimation it is best to use the largest data set available -- i.e., the data set with the 
highest frequency. 
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drive a wedge in the PPP relationship for an extended period. The generalised 
cointegration approach outlined above allows for precisely this type of omitted-
variable effects. 
We begin by estimating the time-varying-coefficient regressions for each 
country and we test whether the symmetry ( 1 2b b= − ) and strict proportionality 
conditions (b1 = 1 and b2 = -1) are satisfied using the total-effect coefficients. 
However, one or both of these conditions could fail because of misspecifications and 
inherent biases present in PPP relationship.  In such a case, if we are able to remove 
the biases, then we may possibly obtain the true coefficients, which will establish 
cointegration within the context of the generalized cointegration framework and 
which should then allow us to assess homogeneity. Therefore, we subsequently 
estimate bias-free coefficients to investigate the symmetry and proportionality 
restrictions. 
 
4.1 Total effects  
Table 1 reports the average total-effect coefficients for our first experiment. 
Recall, these coefficients contain specification biases. Several features of these results 
are noteworthy. First, in the cases of Austria, Belgium, Germany and Greece, the 
results indicate that the exchange rate (units of euros per unit of the U.S. dollar) is 
inversely related to domestic prices and positively related to foreign prices. That is, 
rises in domestic prices and/or falls in foreign prices lead to a nominal appreciation of 
the domestic currency (i.e., a decrease in the number of units of euros per U. S. dollar) 
-- the opposite of what is predicted by homogeneity. Second, in the cases of France, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as for the euro area as a whole, the coefficients on 
the domestic price level and the foreign price level are correctly signed; an oddity 
arises, however, from the magnitude of the price coefficients. Although homogeneity 
states that the price coefficients should be unity (in absolute value), the coefficients 
for those four countries, as well as for the euro area, are generally very different from 
unity. For example, in the case of France the coefficient on home prices is 7.8 while 
the coefficient on foreign prices is -3.7, both of which deviate sharply from unity.  
Third, both price coefficients have the same (positive) signs in the case of only one 
country -- that of the Netherlands. Again, however, the price coefficients for the 
Netherlands are very different from each other and different from unity. 
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How can we explain these results? Our conjecture is that the causes of the 
violation of homogeneity are the biases and the misspecifications inherent in the 
model and the biases that are reflected in the total-effect coefficients. 
To shed light on this issue, consider the (monthly) total-effect TVCs presented 
in Figures 1, 2 and 3. Consistent with the average TVCs reported in Table 1, for 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Greece, the betas of home prices are mostly negative 
while for foreign prices they are mainly positive. For France, Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and the euro zone, most of the TVCs are of the correct sign. For the Netherlands, the 
home-price TVCs generally cluster around zero, while the foreign-price TVCs are 
generally positive. 
Inspection of these figures reveals an interesting pattern. Movements in the 
monthly coefficients of domestic and foreign prices mirror each other in all ten cases 
we considered -- that is, domestic and foreign price coefficients tend to move in 
opposite directions. Table 2 reports correlations between the coefficient estimates of 
domestic and foreign prices. These correlations are very close to minus unity in all ten 
cases. Thus, it appears that a kind of the symmetry condition -- though not the one 
required by PPP -- holds during the sample period. In other words, this symmetry is 
not of the type implying that 1 2t tb b= − ; instead, the movements of the coefficients are 
symmetrical.  
We conjecture that the coefficients of PPP could possibly be uninterpretable and 
biased. This circumstance could occur if, in the short run, there is little movement in 
prices, but the exchange rate moves by a significant amount. In the very short run, 
price changes are almost certainly much smoother (and stickier) than movements in 
nominal exchange rates, so that the relationship between the exchange rate and prices 
is hard to pin-down empirically. In the limit, if prices did not move at all, and the 
exchange rate changes, then the coefficients will not be identified. To explain, rewrite 
Eq. (7) as follows: 
 0 1 2t t t t t ts b b p b fp= + −
 
(11) 
Now suppose the following conditions apply:  
 t tp fp=  and t t tp fp and s η∆ = ∆ ∆ =
 
(12) 
Then, Eq. (11) reduces to 1ts −  + η  = 0tb  + ( 1tb  - 2tb ) tp  (or 1ts −  + η  = 0tb  + ( 1tb  - 
2tb ) tfp ) and 1tb , 2tb  are not identified. When 1tb  = 2tb  = tk , then 1tb  - 2tb  = 0.  Now 
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as 0→∆=∆ tt fpp , then ∞→tk . So we tend to see symmetry because, in general, 
over short periods of time changes in prices tend to be much smaller than changes in 
nominal exchange rates.  
 What we, therefore, observe is the symmetry of the total-effect coefficient, 
which has not been corrected for specification biases; this symmetry gives the odd 
behavior of the coefficients8 shown in Figures 1 through 3. We believe that this 
combination of biased coefficients and lack of identification provides an explanation 
of the common finding of symmetry of the coefficients in PPP tests. 
Table 3 shows the results (for the total effects’ coefficients) for our second 
experiment, which uses both the extended country sample and the longer sample 
period. Again, the picture is very mixed, with little obvious support for PPP. Clearly, 
the non-euro-zone countries perform no better than those of the euro zone, with many 
coefficients far from their expected values. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the movements in 
the total coefficients over the extended period. Interestingly, with the possible 
exception of Canada, here the coefficients do not seem to exhibit the same symmetric 
movements that prevailed in the previous experiment, and appear to be somewhat 
more stable over the longer period. There are some indications of a small change in 
some euro-zone countries around the time of the formation of the euro -- e.g. Austria, 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, the coefficients remain 
far from their expected values. In the case of Mexico, the coefficients seem to exhibit 
changes in (i) the early 1980s, corresponding to the break-out of the Latin American 
debt crisis, (ii) 1987, the year in which Mexico adopted a crawling-peg exchange-rate 
regime, with the exchange rate used as a nominal anchor to bring down inflation, (iii) 
1994, the year of the attack on the Mexican peso and the collapse of the crawling peg, 
and (iv) 2007, the year of the eruption of the global financial crisis. The coefficients 
for Canada also display changes during the time of the eruption of the 2007 global 
financial crisis. 
 
4.2 Bias-free effects 
We now extract the biases from the total coefficients. As described above, this 
is done by dividing the set of coefficient drivers into two subsets and removing the 
                                                 
8 However, we also cannot rule out the possibility that, in some instances, the observed symmetry of 
coefficients could also brake down, despite the actual symmetry of domestic and foreign prices.  
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effect of the group associated with the bias. The coefficient drivers used in each 
regression are three lags of both the domestic and foreign inflation rates.9 
Table 4 shows the averages of the bias-free coefficients for our first experiment 
over the euro-zone period. (The t-ratios in Table 4 pertain to the null hypothesis that 
the betas equal unity.) In all ten cases, the averages of the true coefficients satisfy 
homogeneity almost exactly; in each case the home-price coefficients are close to 
unity, while the foreign-price coefficients are close to minus unity. Most of the t-ratios 
for the coefficients of the domestic prices are close to zero, implying that the 
coefficient estimates are not significantly different from unity. The standard errors 
are, however, quite large; this is partly due to the large change in the coefficients in 
moving from the total effect to the bias free ones. 
However, an inspection of monthly bias-free coefficients  shown in Figures 7, 8 
and 9, shows that the monthly variation in the deviations of coefficients  from unity is 
very high, leading to the rejection of homogeneity in the short run, even though the 
averages of the bias-free estimates are close to unity in absolute values. Moreover, the 
odd kind of symmetry that was observed in the total effect coefficients no longer 
holds for the bias-free coefficients.  As noted above, the empirical literature typically 
rejects PPP over the short run, but sometimes supports PPP in the long-run. Our 
results can be interpreted as strongly supporting long-run homogeneity, while in the 
short run that condition is clearly violated. 
 There are some interesting patterns in the behavior of the monthly coefficients 
of the bias-free effect. Table 5 shows the correlation between the two price 
coefficients in each equation. Most countries have fairly low correlations between the 
two coefficients. So, the symmetry effect, which was evident in the total coefficients, 
is much less pronounced in the bias-free coefficients; the main exceptions are Greece, 
where the correlation is almost exactly -1, and Germany and the euro zone, for which 
in both cases it is around -0.8. However, as reported in Table 4, averaging these 
estimates provides coefficients that are almost exactly proportional.  
Table 6 presents the average estimates of the bias-free coefficients for our 
second experiment over the longer period. The results of this experiment confirm the 
results of first experiment; thus, they present a picture that strongly supports PPP. 
                                                 
9 In general, lags are preferable to differences of variables since the lags capture any non-stationarity in 
the variables, whereas differences are always restricted versions of the lags; such restrictions may be 
inappropriate.  
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(Again, the t-ratios repeated in Table 6 pertain to the null hypothesis that the betas 
equal unity.) All the coefficients are of the correct sign and very close to unity in 
absolute value.  
Consider, for example, the coefficients of the three countries -- Canada, Mexico 
and Japan -- that have been added in the second experiment.  These three countries 
have followed very different exchange-rate regimes during the period from the late-
1950s until early-2011 and have undergone a variety of external and internal shocks. 
In terms of exchange-rate regimes, the Canadian dollar, in contrast to most other 
currencies during the Bretton-Woods period, followed a floating exchange-rate 
regime until 1962 when it moved to an adjustable-peg regime. With the collapse of 
the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, both the 
Canadian dollar and the Japanese yen moved to flexible exchange-rate regimes. 
Mexico followed several types of pegged exchange-rate regimes until the mid-1990s, 
at which time the peso was allowed to float against the U.S. dollar. In terms of 
asymmetric shocks among these three countries, such shocks including the bursting of 
the asset price bubble in Japan in the late-1980s and early-1980s, followed a 
prolonged period of stagnation and deflation. As noted above, Mexico was hit by the 
Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s and the attack on the Mexican peso -- 
beginning in December 1994 -- which led to a 50 per cent depreciation of the peso 
against the U.S. dollar (the reference currency under the crawling-peg exchange-rate 
regime) by March 1995. Yet, despite these (and other shocks), the bias-free 
coefficients for Canada, Mexico and Japan are all near unity in absolute value, 
significant, and correctly signed. 
These findings clearly mean that a standard analysis based on OLS would yield 
highly biased results because of the omission of these developments. Indeed many of 
the events would be very difficult, if not impossible, to capture in a formal model in a 
fully satisfactory way. TVC estimation is designed specifically to deal with the 
situation where such biases arise in OLS estimation because TVC estimation is 
capable of yielding unbiased estimates of the coefficients of interest even in the 
presence of these confounding effects. It is, therefore, not surprising that we do indeed 
find that the average coefficients display homogeneity even when such profound 
structural changes have taken place. 
Figures 10, 11 and 12 trace the bias-free, time-varying coefficients over the 
estimation period 1957:M4 to 2011:M3; again, over the longer period the evidence of 
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symmetric movements seems to have disappeared, and the coefficients are much more 
stable around their expected values. 
We argue that these results of average bias-free coefficients support long-run 
homogeneity. It is important to recall that the technique that we have employed gives 
consistent estimates of the bias-free coefficients, even if some important variables are 
omitted or the variables are measured with errors. Thus, while there may be 
underlying missing trends or problems with the measurement of the price indices, the 
estimation technique we used accounts for such misspecifications. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Previous empirical studies have typically rejected the proportionality -- or, 
homogeneity -- condition underlying PPP, while providing some support for the 
symmetry condition. However, the symmetry condition implies that the basic 
homogeneity of prices and exchange rates inherent in the PPP relationship does not 
hold. Effectively, symmetry implies that, over time, a change in the nominal exchange 
rate will not be fully reflected in domestic prices -- for example, a 50 per cent 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate will not produce a proportional rise in the 
domestic price level. To be clear, our argument is that symmetry does not imply 
proportionality. 
In this paper, we test for the existence of homogeneity, which we defined as 
proportionality in the presence of omitted variables, using two sets of experiments, 
one using data from the euro-zone period and one using data over a much longer 
period. Using a time-varying-coefficient technique, we found that the (total effect) 
coefficients, which are not corrected for specification biases, exhibit symmetry, but do 
not exhibit proportionality. Over the shorter euro-zone period we observe an odd 
proportional movement in the coefficients -- when one coefficient raises the other 
tends to fall, offsetting the rise in the former coefficient; this effect largely disappears 
over the longer period. Our interpretation of this finding is that the coefficients are not 
properly identified. Correcting for specification biases and allowing for missing 
variables, we find strong support for homogeneity -- that is, proportionality in a PPP 
specification that accounts for the effects of other variables -- thus, also providing 
strong support for PPP.  
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Table 1 Averages of total effect coefficients (1999:M1 to 2011:M3) 
Country 0b   1b  2b  
 (1)  (2) (3) 
 
Austria 
-2.251  -0.989 2.151 
[-2.471]  [-0.006] [0.007] 
Belgium 
-1.998  -3.903 4.941 
[-3.721]  [-0.005] [0.007] 
France 
-8.189  7.843 -3.704 
[-6.493]  [0.005] [-0.007] 
Germany 
-1.625  -2.149 3.002 
[-1.116]  [-0.002] [0.003] 
Greece 
-3.635  -0.267 2.123 
[-7.304]  [-0.009] [0.002] 
Italy 
-3.819  2.668 -0.718 
[-6.985]  [0.001] [-0.003] 
Netherlands 
-3.400  0.362 1.377 
[-5.446]  [0.002] [0.001] 
Portugal 
-3.282  1.949 -0.266 
[-11.811]  [0.002] [-0.003] 
Spain 
-2.034  3.867 -2.810 
[-4.976]  [0.005] [-0.006] 
Euro zone 
-4.520  3.524 -1.225 
[-6.289]  [0.002] [-0.002] 
Notes. Monthly data starting from 1999:M1 ending in 2011:M3. For each country the 
number of observations is 144, for Greece the number of observations is 120. Time-varying 
coefficient equation is given as 0 1 2t t t t t ts b b p b fp= + + . All coefficients are averages of 
total effect coefficients; modified t-ratios are in brackets. The null hypotheses 
are 0 0: 0H b = , 0 1: 1H b = and 0 2: 1H b = − . The standard errors are computed using the 
full set of coefficient drivers. 
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Table 2 Correlation between total effect coefficients of home and foreign prices 
(1999:M1 to 2011:M3) 
Foreign prices Domestic prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Austria Belgium Germany Greece 
US -0.998 -0.999 -0.998 -0.999 
     
 France Italy Portugal Spain 
US -0.996 -0.993 -0.991 -0.998 
     
 Netherlands Euro zone   
US -0.948 -0.992   
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Table 3 Averages of total effect coefficients (1957:M4 to 2011:M3) 
Country 0b  1b  2b  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Austria 2.608 0.572 -1.606 
[3.865] [0.029] [-0.052] 
Belgium 
3.355 -0.818 -0.443 
[3.753] [-0.027] [-0.014] 
Canada -0.077 0.538 -0.451 
[-0.795] [0.040] [-0.100] 
France 1.722 1.605 -2.308 
[3.577] [0.034] [-0.105] 
Germany 
1.188 0.239 -0.812 
[4.389] [0.114] [-0.293] 
Greece 1.642 0.098 -0.139 
[3.208] [0.245] [-0.024] 
Italy 5.991 1.378 -3.430 
[2.887] [0.006] [-0.026] 
Japan 
3.193 0.145 -0.710 
[22.728] [0.508] [-0.458] 
Mexico 
 
2.153 1.127 -1.661 
[4.563] [0.332] [-0.315] 
Netherlands 1.195 0.056 -0.594 
[4.374] [0.203] [-0.138] 
Portugal 
2.174 0.228 -0.627 
[2.793] [0.092] [-0.020] 
Spain 3.669 0.883 -2.040 
[2.676] [0.006] [-0.029] 
Notes. Monthly data starting from 1957:M04 ending in 2011:M03. For each country the 
number of observations is 648. Time-varying coefficient equation is given as 
0 1 2t t t t t ts b b p b fp= + + . All coefficients are averages of total effect coefficients; modified t-
ratios are given in brackets. The null hypotheses are 0 0 0 1 0 2: 0, : 1, : 1H b H b H b= = = − . 
The standard errors are computed using the full set of coefficient drivers. 
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Table 4 Averages of bias-free coefficients (1999:M1 to 2011:M3) 
Country 1b  2b  
 (1) (2) 
Austria 
1.040 -0.997 
[0.000] [-0.012] 
Belgium 
1.002 -1.034 
[0.000] [-2.748] 
France 
1.014 -1.044 
[0.012] [-2.034] 
Germany 
1.007 -1.051 
[0.008] [-1.954] 
Greece 
0.998 -1.012 
[0.000] [-1.633] 
Italy 
1.095 -0.987 
[0.068] [-3.084] 
Netherlands 
1.031 -0.978 
[0.041] [-0.006] 
Portugal 
1.066 -1.009 
[0.097] [-0.005] 
Spain 
0.990 -0.984 
[0.015] [-1.982] 
Euro zone 
1.110 -1.013 
[0.091] [-1.996] 
Notes. Monthly data starting from 1999:M1 and ending in 2011:M3. For each country the number of 
observations is 144, for Greece the number of observations is 120. The coefficients are bias-free 
coefficients of the equation 0 1 2t t t t t ts b b p b fp= + + . Averages of constant terms are not presented in 
the table; modified t-ratios are in brackets. The null hypotheses are 0 0: 0H b = , 0 1: 1H b = and 
0 2: 1H b = − . The standard errors are computed using the square root of the variance formula of 
1
ˆ
jt
jd dtd A
zπ
∈∑ where 1 jtA  is an appropriate subset of coefficient drivers (Appendix). 
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Table 5 Correlation between bias-free effect coefficients of home and foreign prices 
(1999:M1 to 2011:M3) 
Foreign prices Domestic prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Austria Belgium Germany Greece 
US 0.583 0.604 -0.824 -0.975 
     
 France Italy Portugal Spain 
US -0.234 -0.051 -0.558 -0.602 
     
 Netherlands Euro zone   
US -0.382 -0.870   
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Table 6 Averages of bias-free coefficients (1957:M4 to 2011:M3) 
Country 1b  2b  
 (1) (2) 
Austria 1.011 -1.067 
[0.001] [-0.066] 
Belgium 
1.080 -1.056 
[0.001] [-0.019] 
Canada 
1.058 -1.070 
[0.002] [-0.079] 
France 1.014 -1.056 
[0.001] [-0.137] 
Germany 
1.020 -1.037 
[0.001] [-0.254] 
Greece 
1.042 -1.014 
[0.001] [-0.010] 
Italy 1.052 -1.076 
[0.001] [-0.063] 
Japan 
0.948 -1.038 
[0.015] [-0.764] 
Mexico 
1.029 -1.044 
[0.081] [-0.387] 
Netherlands 1.056 -1.010 
[0.001] [-0.103] 
Portugal 
0.987 -1.066 
[0.001] [-0.023] 
Spain 
1.056 -1.010 
[0.002] [-0.048] 
Notes Monthly data starting from 1957:M4 and ending in 2011:M3. For each country the number of 
observations is 648.  The coefficients are the bias-free components of the coefficients of equation 
0 1 2t t t t t ts b b p b fp= + + . Averages of the constant terms of the time-varying coefficients model are not 
presented in the table. Modified t-ratios are in brackets. The null hypotheses are  
0 1 0 2: 1, : 1H b H b= = − . The standard errors are computed using the square root of the variance 
formula of 
1
ˆ
jt
jd dtd A
zπ
∈∑  where 1 jtA  is an appropriate subset of coefficient drivers (Appendix). 
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Figure 1 Total effect coefficients for Austria, Belgium, Germany and Greece (1999:M1 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P 
Aus (Austria), P Bel (Belgium), P Ger (Germany), P Gre (Greece). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying “constant” 
term: Con 
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Figure 2 Total effect coefficients for France, Italy, Portugal and Spain (1999:M1 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P Fra 
(France), P Ita (Italy), P Por (Portugal), P Spa (Spain). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying “constant” term: Con. 
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Figure 3 Total effect coefficients for the Netherlands and EU (1999:M1 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P Net (The 
Netherlands), P EU (Euro zone). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying “constant” term: Con. 
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Figure 4 Total effect coefficients for Austria, Belgium, Canada and France (1957:M4 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P 
Aus (Austria), P Bel (Belgium), P Can (Canada), P Fra (France). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying “constant” 
term: Con. 
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Figure 5 Total effect coefficients for Germany, Greece, Italia and Japan (1957:M4 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P Ger 
(Germany), P Gre (Greece), P Ita (Italia), P Jap (Japan). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying “constant” term: 
Con. 
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Figure 6 Total effect coefficients for Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (1957:M4 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P 
Mex (Mexico), P Net (Netherlands), P Por (Portugal), P Spa (Spain). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying 
“constant” term: Con. 
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Figure 7 Bias-free coefficients for Austria, Belgium, Germany and Greece (1999:M1 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P 
Aus (Austria), P Bel (Belgium), P Ger (Germany), P Gre (Greece). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US 
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Figure 8 Total effect coefficients for France, Italy, Portugal and Spain (1999:M1 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P Fra 
(France), P Ita (Italy), P Por (Portugal), P Spa (Spain). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US 
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Figure 9 Total effect coefficients for the Netherlands and EU (1999:M1 to 2011:M3). Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P Net (The 
Netherlands), P EU (Euro zone). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US 
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Figure 1 Total effect coefficients for Austria, Belgium, Canada and France. Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P Aus (Austria), P Bel (Belgium), P Can (Canada), P Fra 
(France). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying “constant” term: Con. 
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Figure 2 Total effect coefficients for Germany, Greece, Italia and Japan. Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P Ger (Germany), P Gre (Greece), P Ita (Italia), P Jap (Japan). 
Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying “constant” term: Con. 
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Figure 3 Total effect coefficients for Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Time-varying coefficients of domestic prices: P Mex (Mexico), P Net (Netherlands), P Por (Portugal), P 
Spa (Spain). Time-varying coefficients of foreign prices (USA): P US. Time-varying “constant” term: Con.
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Appendix: A Technical Exposition of TVC Estimation 
 
When studying the relation of a dependent variable, denoted by *ty , to a 
hypothesized set of –1K  determinants, denoted by ( * *1 1,, ...,t K tx x − ), where these 
–1K  determinants may be only a subset of the complete set of the determinants of 
*
ty , a number of problems can arise. Any specific functional form of the relation may 
be incorrect and may therefore lead to specification errors resulting from the 
erroneous functional form. Another problem that can arise is that * *1 1,, ...,t K tx x −  
do not exhaust the complete list of the determinants of *ty , in which case the relation 
of *ty  to 
* *
1 1,, ...,t K tx x −  may be subject to omitted-variable biases. In addition to these 
problems, the available data on *ty , 
* *
1 1,, ...,t K tx x −  is be perfect measures of the 
underlying true variables, causing the errors-in-variables problem. In what follows, 
we propose the correct interpretations and an appropriate method of estimation of the 
coefficients of the relationship between *ty  and 
* *
1 1,, ...,t K tx x −  in the presence of the 
foregoing problems. We also propose solutions to all these problems. 
Suppose that T measurements on *ty , 
* *
1 1,, ...,t K tx x −  are made and these 
measurements are in fact, the sums of “true” values and measurement errors: 
*
0 t t ty y v= + , 
*
jt jt jtx x v= + ,  1, ..., 1j K= − , 1, ...,t T= , where the variables ty , 
1 1,,...,t K tx x −  without an asterisk are the observable counterparts of the variables with 
an asterisk which are the unobservable “true” values, and the v ’s are measurement 
errors.  
It is useful at this point to clarify what we believe is the main objective of 
econometric estimation. In our view, the objective is to consistently estimate the 
effect on a dependent variable of changing one of its complete set of determinants 
holding all of the remaining determinants of this set constant. That is, we aim to find 
consistent estimators of some of these effects. This interpretation is, of course, 
standard one usually placed on the coefficients of a typical econometric model, but 
the validity of this interpretation depends crucially on that of the assumption that the 
conventional model gives estimates of bias-free coefficients, which is not the case in 
the presence of model misspecification. 
 38 
To deal with this issue, consider a set of time-varying coefficients that provide a 
complete explanation of the dependent variable y.  
 
 0 1 1 1, 1,...t t t t K t K ty x xγ γ γ − −= + + +  (A1) 
 
where ty  = ts , 1tx  = tp , and 2tx  = tfp ,  and K – 1 = 2.  Let a set, denoted by 1S , 
contain those regressors of (A1) that take the value zero with probability zero and let 
another set, denoted by 2S , contain the remaining regressors of (A1) that take the 
value zero with positive probability. We call (A1) “the time-varying coefficient 
(TVC) model”. (Note that this model is formulated in terms of the observed 
variables). The derivation of model (A1) given, for example, in Swamy and Tavlas 
(2007) shows that 0tγ  is the sum of (i) the relevant intercept, (ii) 0tν , and (iii) the 
error term -- this term being the correct function of certain ‘sufficient sets’ of omitted 
regressors is unique -- and for j > 0, jtγ  is the sum of (i) the partial derivative of 
*
ty  
with respect to one of its complete set of determinants holding all of the remaining 
determinants of this set constant and (ii) omitted-variable and (iii) measurement-error 
biases. This derivation does not assume that the true functional-forms of the 
relationships underlying (A1) are known and shows that the formulas for omitted-
variables and measurement-error biases can be derived without knowing what 
variables are omitted from (A1). This derivation also shows that (A1) is obtained by 
inserting appropriate measurement errors at the right places in a model of *ty  with 
unique coefficients and error term. Here the uniqueness means that the coefficients 
and the error term are invariant to changes in the relationship between the included 
regressors, * *1 1,, ...,t K tx x − , and omitted regressors. We call the partial derivative 
component of jtγ  its “bias-free component”. Econometric models with nonunique 
coefficients and error terms are usually employed in the econometrics literature. Any 
distributional assumption we might make about a nonunique error term is arbitrary. 
Estimates of nonunique coefficients and predictions of nonunique error terms given 
by arbitrary error distributions prove nothing. Note, also, that, if the true functional 
forms are non-linear, the corresponding time-varying partial derivatives may be 
thought of as the correct representations of the respective data-generating non-linear 
structures and so they are able to capture any possible function.   
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It is important to stress that, while we start from a TVC model, its estimation 
technique is typically referred to in the literature as time-varying-coefficient 
estimation; the objective here is not to simply estimate a model with changing 
coefficients. We start from (A1) because this is the correct representation of the 
underlying data generation process. In the case of the TVC procedure followed in this 
paper, we extend the standard TVC model typically considered in the literature; 
specifically, we decompose each of these varying coefficients into two parts, a 
consistent estimate of the bias-free part and the remaining part, which is due to biases 
from the various misspecifications in the model. If the data-generating model is linear, 
we would get back to a constant coefficient model. If the data-generating model is 
non-linear, the coefficients of the linear-in-variables form in (A1) will vary over time 
to reflect this circumstance. The key point is that the TVC technique used here 
produces consistent estimates of the bias-free components of the coefficients of 
structural relationships in the presence of model misspecification. 
For empirical implementation, model (A1) has to be embedded in a stochastic 
framework. To do so, we need to answer the question: What are the correct stochastic 
assumptions about the TVC’s of (A1)? We believe that the correct answer is: the 
correct interpretation of the TVC’s and the assumptions about them must be based on 
an understanding of the model misspecification which comes from any (i) omitted 
variables, (ii) measurement errors, and (iii) misspecification of the functional form. It 
turns out that misspecification (iii) is easy to avoid. We expand on this argument in 
what follows. 
Notation and Assumptions Let tm denote the total number of the determinants of
*
ty . 
The exact value of tm  cannot be known at any time. We assume that tm  is larger than 
K-1 (that is, the total number of determinants is greater than the determinants for 
which we have observations) and possibly varies over time.11 This assumption means 
that there are determinants of *ty  that are excluded from (A1) since (A1) includes 
only K-1 determinants. Let *gtx , , ,..., tg K m= , denote these excluded determinants. 
Some of these determinants represent all relevant pre-existing conditions so that these 
conditions are controlled. This is a standard way to reduce spurious correlations to 
zero. Thus, to make these controls knowledge of relevant pre-existing conditions is 
                                                 
11 That is, the total number of determinants is itself time variant. 
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not needed. The equations *ty  = 
* *
1( ,..., )tt t m tf x x  = 
*
0tα  + 
* *
1
tm
t txα=∑    are two different 
but equivalent forms of the relationship between *ty  and all of its determinants with  
*
0tα  = 
*
ty  - 
1 * *
1
K
jt jtj
xα−
=∑  - * *t
m
gt gtg K
xα
=∑ ,  *jtα  = * */t jty x∂ ∂  if *jtx  ∈ 1S  and = * */t jty x∆ ∆  
with the right sign if * 2jtx S∈  1, ..., 1j K= − , and 
*
gtα  = 
* */t gty x∂ ∂ , , ,..., tg K m= . 
These partial derivatives are unique as long as *jtx  and 
*
gtx  are continuous. The true 
functional form of the relationship between *ty and
*
1tx , …, 
*
tm t
x   determines the time 
profiles of *α s. These time profiles are unknown, since the true functional form is 
unknown. Note that an equation that is linear in variables accurately represents a non-
linear equation, provided the coefficients of the former equation are time-varying with 
time profiles determined by the true functional form of the latter equation. This type 
of representation of a non-linear equation is convenient, particularly when the true 
functional form of the non-linear equation is unknown. Such a representation is not 
subject to the criticism of misspecified functional form. For , ,..., tg K m= , let 
1* * * *
0 1
K
gt gt jgt jtj
x xλ λ−
=
= +∑  where *0gtλ  = *gtx  - 1 * *1  
K
jgt jtj
xλ−
=∑  denotes the relevant 
intercept and  *jgtλ  = 
* */gt jtx x∂ ∂  if 
*
1jtx S∈  and = 
* */gt jtx x∆ ∆  if 
*
2jtx S∈ , 
1, ,..., 1j K= − , denote the other coefficients of the regression of *gtx  on 
* *
1 1,, ...,t K tx x − . The true functional forms of the relationships between 
*
gtx  and 
*
1tx , …, 
*
1,K tx −   determine the time profiles of 
*λ s. The partial derivative *jgtλ  is unique if 
*
jtx  is 
continuous.  
The following theorem gives the correct interpretations of the coefficients of 
(A1): 
Theorem 1 The intercept of (A1) satisfies the equation,   
 * * *0 0 0 0
tm
t t gt gt t
g K
vγ α α λ
=
= + +∑  
2
* * *( )
tm
jt gt jgt jt
j S g K
α α λ ν
∈ =
− +∑ ∑    (A2) 
and the coefficients of (A1) other than the intercept satisfy the equations,   
 
 * * * * * *
t tm m
jt
jt jt gt jgt jt gt jgt
g K g K jt
v
x
γ α α λ α α λ
= =
  
= + − +      
∑ ∑  if j 1S∈   
                              = * * *
tm
jt jt jgt
g K
α α λ
=
+ ∑  if j 2S∈              (A3) 
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Proof: See Swamy and Tavlas (2007).12      
  
Note that the distinction between the dicrete and continuous regressors of (A1) 
is lost if the term involving jtv  times jtx  in (A3) is removed from (A3) and added on 
the right-hand side of (A2). This distinction gives additional information that can be 
used to estimate omitted-variables bias in jtγ  with j > 0. Eq. (7) with K = 3 is a 
special case of model (A1). Thus, we may interpret the TVC’s in terms of the 
underlying coefficients with the correct functional forms, the observed explanatory 
variables and measurement errors in the dependent variable and included regressors. 
The quantity ( )* *tm gt jgtg Kα λ=∑  measures omitted-variables bias and 
( ) ( )( )* * *tmjt gt jgt jt jtg K v xα α λ=− + ×∑  measures measurement-error bias. The coefficient 
*
jtα  is unique if 
*
jtx  is continuous. Given the set of omitted regressors, the omitted-
variable biases are unique.   
By assuming that the *α s and *λ s are possibly time-varying, we do not a priori 
rule out the possibility that the relationship of *ty  with all of its determinants and the 
regressions of the determinants of *ty  excluded from (A1) on the determinants of 
*
ty  
included in (A1) are non-linear. It should be noted that for   = 0, 1, …, tm , each 
*
tα  
is functionally dependent on the  *tx . Also, we can assume that the regressors of (A1) 
are correlated with their own coefficients.13 
Theorem 2 For 1, ..., 1j K= − , the terms without involving the jtν  in (A2) and (A3)  
are unique.  
Proof.  See Swamy and Tavlas (2001, 2007).  
 It can be seen from (A3) that the component  *jtα   of  jtγ   is free of omitted-
variables bias ( )* *tm gt jgtg Kα λ==∑ , measurement-error bias 
( ) ( )( )* * *tmjt gt jgt jt jtg K v xα α λ== − + ×∑ , and of functional-form bias, since we allow the 
                                                 
12 The differences between (A2) and (A3) and those in Swamy and Tavlas (2007) arise as a direct 
consequence of our division of the set of the regressors of (A1) into S1 and S 2 in this paper. 
13 These correlations are typically ignored in the analyses of state-space models. Thus, inexpressive 
conditions and restrictive functional forms are avoided in arriving at (A2) and (A3) so that Theorem 1 
can easily hold; for further discussion and interpretation of the terms in (A2) and (A3), see Swamy and 
Tavlas (2001). 
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*α s and *λ s to have the correct time profiles. Note that *jtα  is the coefficient of 
*
jtx  in 
the correctly specified relation of *ty  to all of its determinants. Hence, 
*
jtα  represents 
the bias-free component of the coefficient of *jtx .  
The bias-free component *jtα  is constant if the relationship between 
*
ty  and all of its 
determinants is linear; alternatively, it is variable if the relationship is non-linear. We 
often have information from theory as to the right sign of *jtα . Any observed 
correlation between ty  and jtx  is spurious if 
* 0jtα = .
14 The term ( )* *0tm gt gtg Kα λ=∑  is 
the correct function of the sufficient sets (the *0gtλ ’s) of omitted regressors (the 
*
gtx ’s) 
and hence is the unique error term of (A1) which is not without an error term. 
A key implication of (A2) and (A3) is that, in the presence of a misspecified 
functional form, omitted variables, and measurement error, the errors in a standard 
regression will contain the difference between the right-hand side of (A1) and the 
right-hand side of the standard regression with the errors suppressed. So the errors 
will contain the included x variables.  
The time-varying coefficients are decomposed to give consistent estimators of 
the bias-free components of coefficients in a model which accounts for unknown 
functional forms, its excluded variables and measurement error. The key to this 
decomposition is to use a set of observable variables (z), called coefficient drivers, 
which explain the time variation in the coefficients.  
 
jtγ  = 0j otzπ  + 
1
1
p
jd dt
d
zπ
−
=
∑  + jtε                 (A4) 
 
It is assumed that the regressors of (A1) are conditionally independent of their 
coefficients given the coefficient drivers. This set of coefficient drivers can be split 
into three subsets so that one subset, say the first subset, should be correlated with any 
true variation in the bias-free component while the other two subsets, say the second 
and third subsets, should be correlated with the biases that are present. Effectively, the 
coefficient drivers absorb omitted-variable and measurement-error biases; for further 
discussion, see Swamy, Tavlas, Hall and Hondroyiannis (2010). Once this is achieved 
                                                 
14 We use the term spurious in a more general sense than Granger and Newbold’s (1974), where it 
strictly applies to linear models expressed in terms of integrated variables. Here we mean any 
correlation which is observed between two variables when the true bias-free component of the 
coefficient in the regression of one on the other is actually zero. 
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we can estimate the biases, which come from the second and third subsets of 
coefficient drivers. We remove the estimates of biases from the estimates of total 
coefficients (simply by subtracting these terms from A4) to obtain a consistent 
estimator of the underlying bias-free components. These second and third subsets of 
coefficient drivers act rather like the dual of conventional instruments. The key 
difference, however, is that some of these drivers should be correlated with the 
misspecifications rather than uncorrelated with an error term, as in the case of 
instruments, and this should be much easier to achieve in a real world situation.  
Swamy, Tavlas, Hall and Hondroyiannis (2010) then give a formal derivation of 
the inference procedures and confidence intervals for both the coefficients of (A4) and 
the corresponding TVC’s of (A1). 
